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Korean Affairs Report

(FOUO 2/80)



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KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

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S.KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

'SANKEI SHIMBUN' INTERVIEWS DRP PRESIDENT KIM CHONG-PIL

OW181427 Tokyo SANKEI SHIMBUN in Japanese 16 Jan 80 Morning Edition p 1-5 OW

[Exclusive interview with Kim Chong-pil, president of the South Korean Democratic Republican Party, held by SANKEI SHIMBUN Columnist Minoru Shibata on 15 January at DRP headquarters in Seoul]

[Excerpts] [Question] First, how do you historically view the achievements of President Pak Chong-hui's administration, which lasted for 18 years and 5 months since the 16 May [1961] military revolution?

Kim: In a nutshell, I think that there was no other leader in Korean history who bequeathed as many achievements as President Pak. There may be various criteria to apply, but I think the fact that he laid the foundation for the modernization of the ROK will be clearly recorded in history.

The military revolution became the motive and the starting point for the modernization of the ROK. President Pak wanted to lay the foundation in the 1960's, make leaps in the 1970's and bring about an era of democratization in 1980's in which we would be able to enjoy as much freedom as we want. At a stage where we succeeded in laying the foundation and making leaps for the present as a result of successful implementation of four 5-year plans in the 1960's and 1970's, President Pak passed away. Therefore, I think that President Pak's achievements will be highly evaluated.

[Question] At present a reform or a revision of the Yusin system is underway and the word democratization is frequently used. What do you think of this democratization? At what pace and in what way do you think democratization should be promoted?

Kim: A deluge of the word democratization means that the cornerstone is laid for practicing democracy. It also means that every one has the desire to apply it more deeply and broadly in his daily life. I think that it is a sign of this phenomenon. Without the foundations laid in the 1960's and 1970's, it may be impossible to even hope for those things. However, since the foundations have been laid, we have arrived at a stage where we can practice it. The president passed away on 26 October. The so-called

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Yusin system is one established temporarily to overcome the difficult situation and it was not a permanent one. Therefore, I interpret that its time limit expired with the death of the president and a new age has arrived.

[Question] Debates on constitutional amendments are very actively underway now. What is the draft plan worked out thus far by the DRP like?

Kim: The party's final draft has not yet been worked out and a study is still underway. The assembly's ad hoc committee on constitutional amendments has only recently started holding public hearings. I think that it will take several months. We want to get it over with by around this summer.

[Question] In case there is a presidential election, do you intend to run as a presidential candidate? Have you made up your mind?

Kim: It is nonsensical to talk about next year. The only thing I can do now is to do my best to fulfill my duty as DRP president. I am not thinking of anything else now.

[Question] Recently North Korea (DPRK) made a proposal by sending letters to South Korea, a letter whose addressees include you. How do you evaluate this? What is the North's aim?

Kim: The North's true motive is still unknown. What I can say now is that it may be the North's reply to a call made by President Pak on 19 January last year for talks between the authorities in the North and the South. I think that it is being studied by the authorities. I hope that sincere talks will be held between the South and the North this year with new resolve. I believe that in all circumstances we must avert the tragedy of a fratricidal war. To this end, we must try to increase those things we have in common one by one through talks. The severance between the two sides has lasted 30 years, and there was a war in 1950. There are too many heterogeneous things. We want to patiently find the root of homogeneity through dialog. My feeling is that today, in the 1980's, we want to promote a dialog with a clear-cut posture and without missing any opportunity.

[Question] South Korea today ushered in a new age and faces a new trial. Do you not think that there is a possibility or a danger in which the North will take advantage of this opportunity and abuse it?

Kim: I think that the possibility cannot be precluded. Unlike us, the North has not changed its basic attitude in the least since 1947. It has not changed in the least its basic design to communize the Korean peninsula by force or arms. Therefore, I do not think that we can preclude all possibilities.

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S. KOREA/ECONOMY

PROBLEM AREAS, BRIGHT SPOTS IN ROK ECONOMY POINTED OUT

Tokyo SANKEI in Japanese 6 Jan 80 p 4

[Article by Special Correspondent Hoshino: "..."]

[Text] When the Republic of Korea's economy is looked at from the long term point of view, many questions and difficulties can be pointed out.

The first of those is the modernization of industry. It can be said that the key to industrial modernization is not the importing of the newest machinery piece by piece from the advanced countries and then exporting the assembled machinery, but is whether the technology whereby Korea itself can build the entire machinery can be acquired in the 80's. It is hoped this will be possible in the 80's.

The second problem is whether modernization of an enterprise's management corresponding to the modernization of such technology can be realized or not. No separation of management and capital is exercised in much of present day Korean enterprise. It can be said that on account of that, various abuses have occurred and a national income differential has been formed. Total modernization will come when a separation of management and capital is exercised along with an accumulation of capital and a rational management of enterprise takes root. To the extent that that cannot be done, Korean enterprise will not grow to an international level. But can long term capital really be provided for that? It can be said that this is one of the biggest questions to be resolved in the 80's.

The third difficulty is the problem of resources, especially oil, and the energy shortage. It is obvious that economic growth will be greatly hindered in this respect. This is not only a problem for Korea, but also certainly a common worry of the advanced countries, including Japan. On the one hand, national defense expenditures can be given as a primary factor hindering Korea's own economic growth. They account for 37 percent of the total budget in the FY1980 budget, which is more than in 1979, and correspond to 6 percent of the gross national product. These national defense expenditures are certainly inevitable as long as the situation of the north-south division does not improve; and it is certain these are a major factor restraining a continuation of economic growth.

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Finally, the worsening of the export environment can be mentioned. The global economic outlook is not at all that bright, with the protectionist trend of the advanced nations piling up. Economic growth cannot be hoped for globally given that technological innovation is at a present lowpoint, and a transition to some sort of stagnation cannot be helped. It will be difficult to get out of this business stagnation, no matter at what point it is, as long as the ultimate of the greatest technological innovations, through which energy substitutes for oil are developed, are not attained. Korea is not excepted from involvement in this.

From that point of view, it seems the 1980's will be quite difficult for the Korean economy, but should not necessarily be viewed pessimistically.

The main reason for not viewing it so is the possibility that Korea's superior labor force and its abundant manpower with its high level of education and its nature will overcome the difficulties.

The incident of President Park's assassination was a major turning point. It cannot be denied that a new turning point in economic management will also come, distinct from political questions, arising from the incident, such as constitutional reform.

Within several years, the government leadership form of economic management that has existed until now will gradually disappear. The compulsory drive to export and money policies will gradually lessen in relative importance. The economic measures so full of inconsistencies will also be improved. Korea's economic character cannot help but change, even though gradually, as a result of all of this. Instead of that, the economy requires responsibility and obligation, which are inseparable from freedom.

The "sweet honey jar" the government has provided until now must be sought after and produced itself. But the question is how much Korea's economy will adjust and accommodate itself to this new kind of environment. The 80's will be the test the Korean economy must pass in order for it to grow into a modern economy.

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N. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

NORTH KOREAN SPY TECHNIQUES IN JAPAN

Tokyo HIMITSUSEN, ZAINICHI CHOHOIKAN NO KATSUDO in Japanese Aug 78
pp 118-159

[Excerpt from book by Ichiro Akashi: HIMITSUSEN, ZAINICHI CHOHOIKAN NO KATSUDO [Secret War, the Activities of Foreign Intelligence Agencies in Japan]

[Text] If the reader who possesses a high performance short-wave radio were to turn his dial late in the evening, he would probably hear many peculiar sounds which are neither English nor Chinese, or Russian. The music of "Ariran" and other such Korean songs is often heard in these broadcasts.

If you scan from one end of the dial to the other you will know how many of these broadcasts there are. If you understand Korean, you will know that these broadcasts are merely reading of numbers.

This is a mode of communication which is called "A3" in the specialized jargon of radio broadcasting. The numbers which are read off are cipher taken from a randomly numbered key. The person receiving the numbers only understands what they mean after he deciphers them with a randomly numbered key. There are also communications which are like telegrams being sent. This is a transmission mode called "A2" and, of course, these communications report only numbers.

These communications are orders sent by the Fourth Bureau of the Department of Political Security of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (the bureau in charge of external operations) to undercover agents in Japan.

Ordinarily, it seems that only one or two set channels are used as the frequencies for sending instructions to an intelligence organization; i.e., one unidentified signal carries instructions to only one organization. Since the same frequency is not used by more than one organization, one can, to some extent, calculate the number of North Korean organizations operating undercover in Japan by counting these unidentified signals.

From this kind of rough calculation it would seem that there are roughly several hundred North Korean operative organizations active in Japan. Whatever the case might be as far as quality is concerned, quantitatively this is the highest number for any of the national intelligence agencies operating in Japan.

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Actually, from the first North Korean spy incident in September 1950 until the Han T'ae-hong incident in November 1976, there have been a total of 40 cases in which Korean spies have been arrested in Japan.

The equipment with which these radio spies are provided is fairly good equipment. In the incident involving Kim Pang-chin who was arrested trying to infiltrate from the coast of Aomori Prefecture on 23 November 1969, two high performance transistorized radios capable of sending over 400 to 800 characters per minute, code charts, random numerical tables for deciphering, and time schedules for receiving cipher messages which this group had hidden in the sand dunes of Noshiro City, Akita Prefecture, were discovered and confiscated. Reportedly, some of the random numerical tables and code charts were made very small and were written in very small letters on paper which was about the age of cigarette paper. In the "Hamasaka case" (29 September 1960) involving Kim Chun-gong about 1,000 numerals were printed on an extremely small piece of paper 3.8 centimeters long by 2.7 centimeters wide. Kim had a magnifying glass for reading this numerical key. In the "Mimura Case" (26 June 1974) involving Kong Yong-sun, a random numerical table was placed in a "Cherry" brand cigarette. Very small numbers were written compactly on cellophane-like paper and this was placed inside the "Cherry."

Endless Traffic on Japan Sea Route

30-Ton High Speed Boats

The infiltration route into Japan for North Korean spies is the so-called "Japan Sea Route" by which they come across the Japan Sea in high speed boats.

Usually they come in high speed boats which are refitted 30 ton fishing boats; the boats come to about 500 meters offshore from the planned landing site, drop off a rubber boat which only the infiltrating agents and oarsmen board. The rubber boat then heads for the landing site. After reaching land, the rubber boat drops off only the infiltrating agent and then returns to the larger vessel.

Sometimes the agents infiltrate into Japan in this manner by themselves and sometimes there are organizations waiting to guide them.

Any number of times in the past places where these high speed boats using the "Japan Sea Route" have been frequenting along the Japanese coast have been discovered, but never once has an arrest been made by the patrol boats of the Maritime Safety Agency. On the contrary, there have been incidents in which patrol boats pursuing the high speed boats have come under fire from automatic rifles.

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About 0015 hours on 14 April 1970 in an area 1.8 kilometers east of Nekozaiki in Takeno-Cho, Sharosaki-gun in Hyogo Prefecture, a patrol boat discovered an unidentified vessel which was moving without lights and ordered the vessel to stop. The vessel, however, began to flee northward at the high speed of 20 knots. The patrol boat drew to within 300 meters and took photographs but was fired upon two or three times by automatic rifles from the unidentified vessel.

It was a very bold action indeed.

Let us look into an actual case of infiltration by the "Japan Sea Route" by following the experience of Ko Yong-ho who was arrested for violation of the directives governing emigration and immigration on 16 October 1974. Ko Yong-ho is a former lieutenant of the South Korean Army who managed an automobile repair business in Tokyo but, having accepted various assistance with his business from Yi Tong-chun, organizational division chief of the Chosen Soren, [General Federation of Koreans Residing In Japan], he was subjected to Yi Tong-chun's brainwashing operations. Yi's brainwashing and training extended over approximately 70 occasions.

As a result, in August 1967 Ko Yong-ho was ordered to return to North Korea and on 10 August he returned by a boat going back to Korea from Niigata. Having arrived at Chiongjin, Ko Yong-ho was taken to Pyongyang.

After arriving there he was instructed by a teacher from the Workers Party central cadre school in the Pyongyang International Hotel for about four months from October 1967 until the beginning of February 1968.

Then, for a long period of about 3 years, he received special lectures and training in politics, economics and military matters from teachers of the North Korean Workers Party's cadre school in a separate house in Pyongyang which is called "Reception Center No. 8".

In addition to this basic training, he also received training as a secret agent.

Finally, on 6 October, he was given orders for underground operations for a coup-d'etat in South Korea and he was to infiltrate into Japan to establish a foothold for this coup.

Late on the night of 9 October Ko Yong-ho arrived by high speed boat at a point about 500 meters off Iwasaki in Nishitsugaru-gun, Aomori Prefecture, Japan. Along with four members of the crew he climbed down a rope ladder into a rubber boat and, using transceiver to keep in contact with their reception party on land they rowed to the shore in about 20 minutes.

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Then two of the crew members who had come ashore with KO went ahead about 300 meters to a place where there was a large pine tree. They returned in about 10 minutes. The two said that everything was done, led KO forward and turned him over to the person who was to meet him. They spent the night there, out of doors, and rose around 0500 hours the next morning. They walked to an unattended train station in the neighborhood and boarded the first train. They arrived in Tokyo by way of Higashi Noshiro and Sendai.

After that he was active moving about between hotels in Tokyo and Japanese style inns at Hakone, Nikko and such places. What could be the objective of these North Korean spies who infiltrate Japan by the "Japan Sea Route" and communicate late at night with unidentified radio signals?

They come because of the peculiar geography and the peculiar demographic composition of Japan.

To North Korea, the Japanese archipelago is a rear base for people who would invade the Korean peninsula. It is, in fact, a base which the U.S. Forces in Japan have developed.

If the U.S. Forces in Japan under General MacArthur had not intervened in the Korean War which began in 1950, the North Korean army with its new types of tanks and fighter planes provided by the Soviet Union would have succeeded in overwhelming and occupying the entire Korean Peninsula.

Conversely, if the U.S. Forces had not had bases in the Japanese archipelago, they would not have been able to advance into the Korean peninsula or would have felt extreme inconveniences. At the least, they would have faced difficulties in maintaining their supply lines.

Particularly since the recent decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea, the existence of the Japanese archipelago as a rear base has, one can say, become even more important in case of major occurrence.

There is, then, information in Japan which North Korea wants very much to know. This would be information on trends in the U.S. Forces in Japan and the Japanese Self Defense Forces, information on the status of their strategy in the Far East and their weapons, information of political, social and economic trends in Japan and information on South Korea.

Furthermore, there are about 600,000 Koreans living in Japan. About half of these people are concentrated in the Chosen Soren in Japan which has North Korean connections.

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One can probably say that it is indispensable to the national security of North Korea to send agents into this situation in Japan, to look for information on and movements of the U.S. Forces in Japan and the Self-Defense Forces, which can probably be called auxiliaries to the U.S. Forces, and to organize all of the Koreans in Japan into the Chosen Soren.

Furthermore, in post-war Japan there is no law to protect secrets nor is there a counterespionage act. Even when exposed, spies are not tortured or executed. They are, at most, charged with violation of immigration-emigration directives or violation of ordinances governing use of radio frequencies. And, since Japan sends out no jamming signals, Japan is ideal for communicating with the home country by radio. Japan's capability for locating unidentified signals is weak.

A weak capability for maritime police work is also a problem. It is the task of the Maritime Safety Agency to expose "the Japan Sea Route" on the water but the agency has not succeeded in a single case. The high speed boats which operate in secret are faster than the patrol boats. In addition, it is nearly impossible to get information on this sort of thing. For the present infiltration of Japan by North Korean agents by the "Japan Sea Route" will probably go on.

North Korean State Department for Political Security Organization by Missions

The entity in charge of the intelligence operations against Japan which are described above is North Korea's State Department for Political Security.

The State Department for Political Security was formerly a bureau in the Ministry of Public Security but its status was raised by a "Special Directive to Separate the Department of Political Security from the Ministry of Public Security" which was issued by Kim Il-song in 1973.

The Department of Political Security is composed of 16 bureaus and four offices in its central headquarters. They are as follows.

First Bureau (Coordination and Guidance Bureau): Planning and coordination of security affairs and counterintelligence operations.

Second Bureau (Escort Bureau): Mainly for guarding Kim Il-song and gathering information relative to that task.

Third Bureau (Investigation Bureau): Interrogation of spies, persons connected with spies and political offenders.

Fourth Bureau (External Affairs Bureau): External intelligence operations and counterintelligence operations abroad.

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Fifth Bureau (Internal Affairs Bureau): Internal inspection of public agencies and firms and factories.

Sixth Bureau (Organization Bureau): Assignment and rotation of personnel to regional offices and military political security offices.

Seventh Bureau (Education Bureau): Training, education, planning of training operations, etc., for agency personnel and secret agents.

Eighth Bureau (Data Bureau): Investigation of Koreans repatriated from Japan, and their relatives and acquaintances.

Ninth Bureau (Science Bureau): Operations to intercept and record wired and wireless communications.

Tenth Bureau (Analysis Bureau): Censorship of Domestic and overseas mail, telegrams, documents, etc.

Eleventh Bureau (General Affairs Bureau): Matters relating to encryption and documentation of state secrets and confidential material in general.

Twelfth Bureau (Personnel Bureau): Personnel affairs for agency employees in general.

Thirteenth Bureau (Cadre Bureau): Cadre personnel affairs.

Fourteenth Bureau (Communications Bureau): In charge of liason and all types of internal and external communications operations.

Fifteenth Bureau (Rear Services Bureau): Supply and transportation affairs.

Sixteenth Bureau (Finance Bureau): Organization of the budget and operational management.

Looking at this structure, we can probably say that the North Korean Department of Political Security has an organizational structure which is divided according to mission rather than geographical areas.

The agents who infiltrate by the "Japan Sea Route" are dispatched by the Fourth Bureau but they receive their education and training from the Seventh Bureau and they communicate with the Tenth Bureau.

The existence of the Eighth Bureau is also probably important as far as operations against Japan are concerned. The North Korean agents who have infiltrated go on to cultivate people who will collaborate and supply information through the so-called "root man operations" (more on these operations follows), but it seems that supplying basic information in connection with the "root man operations" is the work of the Eighth Bureau.

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The Tragedy of the "Root Man Operations"

Collaborator Operations as Seen in an Actual Case

The North Korean agents who have infiltrated by the "Japan Sea Route" generally go on to cultivate collaborators by the method called "root man operations."

The "root man operations" are a method of operating which is directed against Koreans living in Japan. As a result of Korea being divided into North and South by the 38th parallel because of the Korean war, there are very many cases where relatives, whether they like it or not, are living apart, divided between North and South. The "root man operations" are a type of hostage tactic which uses this historical tragedy of the Korean people in intelligence operations. Let me use an actual case to introduce the method used in "root man operations." The situation in the "Kanda Incident" (15 March 1965) involving Yi Yong-ch'ol was as follows.

A man, (Yi Yong-ch'ol, a North Korean agent who had infiltrated by the "Japan Sea Route") casually came into the coffeehouse operated by "E".

Yi ordered a beer and introduced himself as someone who had come from North Korea on trade business. Then Yi showed Mr. "E" a photograph. The photograph showed Yi with "E"'s son. The son had been born when "E" was married in North Korea before the war and was still there after the war.

Then Yi pressured "E" to cooperate with him. He said that if "E" refused, the son in North Korea would be killed. "E"'s wife's sister was also in North Korea. Yi produced a picture of her and said that she was in good health.

"E" and his wife had to become Yi's collaborators. Yi moved into the "E" household. After that "E" was worked hard in various ways as Yi's tool.

In this kind of "root man operation" "E"'s son and his wife's sister are called the "roots" and "E" and his wife are called the "root persons". The "root persons" are designated for the agent before he infiltrates and he goes straight to them after he lands.

At first the "root persons" are used only for familiar, simple things. Ultimately, however, they are set up as independent agents.

Let me give some further explanation about the agent who was selected through the "root man operation" in the Kanda Incident. A week later, under orders from Yi, "E" was made to help dig up a wireless set and some U.S. paper currency which had been buried at a certain place in the Kyoto administrative district. When he had completed this and had returned to Tokyo, he was immediately ordered to convert the 3,000 U.S. dollars which he had dug up into Japanese yen. He found a blackmarket broker and converted the dollars to 1.02 million yen.

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Initially, Yi took 120,000 yen and the balance was deposited under the name of Mr. "A".

Instructions to Yi from North Korea were broadcast from Pyongyang on the 5th and 10th of every month. This was done in the A-3 mode. The numbers given were read and then decrypted with the random number chart.

Yi moved from "E"'s household to an apartment and, at this time, began to operate under and assumed Japanese identity. He founded a trading company and got "E" and four others to provide capital. Some of the people involved were Japanese. Yi became president of the company. He possessed Japanese identification papers which he had counterfeited.

On the other hand, he ordered "E" to counterfeit alien registration documents for him and had "E" introduce him to a female Japanese acquaintance of "E"'s. Soon, they began living in an area in Kawaguchi City, Saitama Prefecture. It is said that this woman believed Yi to be Japanese. Yi also ordered "E" to buy about 30 copies of the Tokyo telephone directory, train schedules, the directory of government officials, maps of all wards in the metropolitan administrative district and maps of the Kanto area of Japan. He had Mr. "E" purchase books on shipbuilding and automobiles at random.

Then, in the latter part of November of that year, "E" was made to carry the items he had purchased to Niigata Prefecture where he turned them over, at a place designated by Yi, to a certain person being repatriated to North Korea. In March 1965, Yi was arrested by the Metropolitan Police Department on suspicion of illegal entry into the country and violation of the ordinances governing radio frequencies. "After "E" was developed from a "root person" to a full-fledged agent, he had been ordered to get Koreans living in Nagoya to be a collaborator. When two "root persons" were selected, the decision to approach a Japanese acquaintance was made.. Thus, the eyes of the North Korean intelligence agency are fixed sharply on Koreans in Japan and are looking for "root people."

Spies Who Came To Prepare for the Korean War

Operations Against Japan Are Also Aimed at South Korea

The North Korean intelligence agency attaches importance to "operations against South Korea" on a par with the "root man operations."

Rather, it can probably be said that the "operations against Japan" are themselves footholds for "operations against South Korea."

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The "First North Korean Spying Incident" in which the arrest was made by the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps in Japan early in the morning of 9 September 1950 and which became the first North Korean spy case, was targeted "at Japan" and "at South Korea."

In August 1949 Colonel Sok [phonetic] of the North Korean Public Safety and Political Security Ministry (Now the State Department of Political Security) ordered Ho Kil-song, alias Iwamura, and Ko Tal-min to form an intelligence net in Japan to gather information on occupation forces, police, and factories supplying military needs. He ordered them to "send about 100 Koreans living in Japan to North Korea for training as agents against Japan."

Iwamura, together with the other person, secretly came to Japan by motorized sailboat. In Japan they organized a group of 18 persons (16 of these were Korean and two were Japanese). Before Iwamura and the other person arrived, a group of agents including Nam Sin-Ku who had been sent by the North Korean Workers Party were already active in Japan. The Iwamura group operated with the cooperation of the Nam group.

These groups were fairly successful. They were particularly successful in obtaining military information.

On 25 June 1950, the North Korean Army crossed the 38th parallel and swept southward. The North Korean People's Army began a violent advance headed by Soviet made T34 tanks. The equipment of the North Korean Army was excellent. The South Korean Army, with its old model equipment could not contend at all and the advance U.S. Forces which had been introduced from Kyushu on 5 July were easily broken through in the Osan area south of Seoul (which has since become a U.S. Forces base) and were finally pushed back to the Pusan area.

In order to break out of this situation, the United Nations Commander, General MacArthur, conceived the strategy of cutting the enemy's supply lines by landing at Inchon in the enemy's rear. However, Joint U.S. Chief of Staff Bradley and others at the U.S. Joint Staff headquarters strongly opposed this plan because the difference between high and low tides at Inchon was as high as ten meters. They proposed, instead, a landing at Kunsan to the south.

MacArthur, however, pushed for the Inchon landing tactic with absolute confidence and, as a result, on 29 August the Joint Chiefs of Staff, too, approved the plan for landing at Inchon. Then, on 10 September a powerful sea and air attack on Wolmi Island at the entrance to Inchon harbor was begun. A great number of napalm bombs were dropped on Wolmi Island and by the 23rd its fortifications were completely destroyed by naval bombardment and bombing. Landing operations were conducted on the 24th and the island was occupied. The next day, the 25th, the soldiers of the U.S. First Division began landing at Inchon and the landing operation was a success. This Inchon landing became General MacArthur's last glorious achievement.

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The North Korean Army, with its supply lines cut off as a result of the Inchon landing, was routed and the situation was reversed.

It is said that the HO, alias Iwamura, group succeeded in obtaining planning papers concerning the Inchon landing operation. Then, they were arrested by the U.S. Forces Counterintelligence Corps early in the morning on 9 September, the day before the United Nations Forces began activities in preparation for the Inchon landing.

In addition, the HO group had secretly had about 30 young Koreans living in Japan go to North Korea to receive training as agents in Japan. Also, after the Korean war broke out, they conducted operations to get Korean agents from Japan to volunteer for the South Korean Army in order to create disorder in South Korea.

The money for these operations was provided by smuggling. Morphine and santonin were smuggled in from North Korea and sold in Japan. When the smuggling vessels came to Japan they were loaded with morphine and santonin and they went back carrying information and data.

These spy groups also participated in the incident a week before the Korean war broke out in full when Kim Ch'on-hae who was the chief executive of the group of North Koreans in Japan, a member of the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party and chief of that party's Korean Department, boarded the Japanese vessel "Kasumi Maru" at Maizuru and secretly fled for his life to Wonson in North Korea.

At that time, North Koreans in Japan under the direction of the Japanese Communist Party carried out violence-oriented disruptive activities. Therefore, in September 1949, the Special Investigations Bureau of the Legal Office (now the Public Security Investigation Agency) ordered the Chosen Soren disbanded under ordinances regulating groups and so forth. Kim Ch'on-hae had played a role which bridged the gap between the Japan Communist Party and the Chosen Soren but after the Chosen Soren was disbanded he entered a hospital in Yokohama. Since HO, alias Iwamura, and Nam Sin-cha infiltrated Japan and carried on such activities as building a spy net and assisting in the flight of Kim Ch'on-hae to North Korea before the Korean War broke out, we can see that North Korea was making various kinds of advance preparations before starting the Korean War.

Two years later, in 1952, Kim Il-kok infiltrated Japan. Kim first left North Korea for Hong Kong and came to Japan masquerading as a Chinese in Hong Kong. He came by the "Hong Kong Route" rather than the "Japan Sea Route." It is known that North Korea had been using the "Hong Kong Route" from a fairly early date.

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Kim landed at Wakamatsu in Shizuoka Prefecture and entered the country by obtaining another person's crewman's book. After that he carried on intelligence operations by organizing Koreans in Japan. The main intelligence targets for Kim's group were information on the U.S. Forces in Japan and the National Safety Force (as the present Self Defense Forces were called then.) He was also to get a grasp on industrial capability within Japan.

Kim was arrested in September 1953, nearly 2 years after he had infiltrated into Japan. This case has been called the "Second North Korean Spy Incident."

Later, in June 1955, the "Third North Korean Spy Incident" occurred. The ringleader, Han Chae-tok, came to Japan aboard a smuggler named the "Eiju Maru."

It is noteworthy that in addition to operations to gather intelligence on U.S. Forces in Japan and on Japan, Han's group also had the mission of operating against South Korea and operating among Japanese political and financial circles in order to start Japanese-Korean trade.

From this it seems that North Korea had wanted trade with Japan from a fairly early point. Of course, from the standpoint of the clandestine war, trade, too, is a way of building routes for intelligence operations.

Especially if trade delegations are established in the other country, success is met in establishing a legal resident agency and this becomes a foothold for other kinds of operations.

The Corpse of an Armed North Korean Spy Drifts Ashore

Early in the morning on 1 April 1963, a (20-year-old) local factory worker named Shim Terazawa who was training for a marathon on the beach at Asauchi-hama, Noshiro City, Akita Prefecture, discovered a strange object floating in the surf. Moving closer to take a look, he saw two corpses and a rubber boat floating in the surf. Furthermore, on closer look, one of the corpses seemed to be carrying a handgun in a case. Terrified, the young man ran to the police.

The incident did not end here. On 10 May, about 40 days later, a decomposed corpse was found near the mouth of the Yoneshiro River. On examination it was estimated that 20 days or more had passed since the death. The discovery of the first two bodies has been called the "First Noshiro Incident" and the finding of the other body later on has been called the "Second Noshiro Incident."

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The three corpses and the items with them were examined; a Soviet-made Tokarev pistol marked with CCCP (the Cyrillic equivalent of SSSR, which is the abbreviation for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), a wireless set, seven pages of random charts, maps of Tokyo, Osaka and South Korea, suits, underwear and other clothing and food were found. The bodies also carried a lot of money. There were considerable amounts in U.S. dollars, Japanese yen and South Korean paper currency. After examination of the items carried, it was presumed that the three persons were North Korean spies. It was determined by examination of the contents of the corpses' stomachs that the three were from the same group.

On the basis of these judgments, the authorities conjectured that the following probably had happened. According to the authorities reconstruction of the incident, the three spies arrived off Noshiro in a high speed smuggling vessel late on the evening of 31 March. About an hour after eating they got into a rubber boat and tried to come ashore on the beach. Because the waves in the Japan Sea were rough, however, the rubber boat capsized. The spies froze because of the cold currents and drowned. It seems that at that time two of the three persons drifted to the same place but the other person was carried off and was discovered after having drifted for 40 days.

There is an unanswered question because the spies carried a pistol. Up to this point none of the North Korean spies who had been arrested had been armed. Could there have been some special purpose in these spies being armed?

There have been all sorts of explanations. "The pistol was for countering opposition to their landing." "No, it was for assassinations."

Ultimately, because they were carrying maps of South Korea and a large amount of South Korean money (226,000 won, a large amount at that time), it was decided that the three spies were "agents targeted against South Korea" who were infiltrating South Korea by way of Japan. It was viewed that the pistol was to be used in South Korea.

One of the main objectives of agents targeted against South Korea in infiltrating Japan is to infiltrate South Korea by way of Japan. Since there are many Koreans living in Japan, the agents mix with these people and consider ways of infiltrating South Korea after that. It is easier to infiltrate South Korea by going through Japan than it is to infiltrate directly into South Korea which takes strict precautions against this. The Sea of Japan coast of Japan is the area frequently used for these infiltrations of Japan.

On 21 May, about 10 days after the "Second Noshiro Incident" the "Sakata Incident" occurred. In this incident the people arrested were on the point of leaving the country.

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In Sakata City in Yamagata Prefecture the evening of 20 May is the festival of Sakata Tenno. Mr. A who works for a shipping company had returned to the prefecture for the festival. Mr. B, a taxi driver and a relative who had come there, told "A" the following story.

"Just now I carried a strange group of three Koreans from an inn to the Juritsuka coast."

The Juritsuka coast is a desolate place with only sand beaches and wind forest protection. Furthermore, it was evening and a light rain was falling.

Since he worked for a shipping firm, Mr. A said knowingly, "Maybe they are smugglers!" Immediately, Mr. A reported to the Sakata police.

Officers from Sakata immediately rushed to the place. There they discovered the three who had set up a vinyl tent among the windbreaker trees and were drinking.

The officers made them show their alien registration papers. One of the men's papers was counterfeit. The officers arrested the three Kim Yong-Sok, An Song-Kuk and Yi Chong-t'aek. The three had completed their mission in Japan and were waiting on Juritsuka beach for a boat to come to meet them so that they could secretly leave the country to go home.

The 20th of May was a festival day in Sakata City. Therefore, the police could reasonably be expected to set aside personnel to police the festival and to be shorthanded as far as policing the beach and natural areas were concerned. The men may have been waiting on Juritsuka beach on 20 May with this in mind. But the plan was ineffective. It ended in failure because a citizen used his head.

From this we can see how great a role a little attentiveness on the part of the average citizen can play in counter-intelligence. If each citizen had the intuition and spirit of cooperation with security agencies that Mr. A had, this would constitute a tremendous counterintelligence capability.

Suspicious Guests at an Inn

We heard the following story from a Mr. C who several years ago took a trip in the Hagi area of Yamagata Prefecture, a renowned spot in the Sanin Area.

One evening when C was staying at a youth hostel he met a strange person. Since he happened to be with the man in the bath, he tried to talk to him but what the man said was strange. The man seemed to be in his early thirties. The man said he had come from Kyoto and had been in Kyoto a long time but he had no trace of the Kyoto accent at all. Not only this but he also said that he had been sightseeing in Hagi City the day before, but on

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the location of places of interest and the means of getting to them his version was completely different from C's who had actually been sightseeing in Hagi the day before. Thinking that this was indeed a strange fellow, "C" nevertheless left him alone. Then, at the evening meeting at the youth hostel, when the hosteler was talking with the overnight guests, the man spread out maps and went paging through the lodgers notes where lodgers give their impressions of trips. He went through the notes from beginning to end and took down a lot of memos for himself. The following morning this suspicious person left early. Since this somewhat bothered C, a friend asked the people of the hostel where the man was going. They said that he left after asking about transportation to the beach. The beach there is a secluded place with nothing but sand beach, rocks and trees to break the wind. There are no good roads. Only then did C realize, "This fellow might be a spy smuggled in by boat from North Korea."

With this he realized that the man's illogical conversation on the evening before sounded as though he had memorized an old guidebook.

If C, like A, had awakened a little bit earlier, perhaps a North Korean spy could have been arrested.

Nevertheless, on 16 June, 27 days after the "Sakata Incident" a high speed boat transmitting unauthorized signals appeared in the same area off Sakata City. The authorities judged that this, too, was a smuggling vessel carrying North Korean agents.

A Spy Who Obtained Foreign Ministry Secrets

Clever Excuse to Approach Official

On 16 November 1967, Shingo Yamamoto, an official in the Eastern European Division of the European and Asian Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was arrested by the Metropolitan Police Department on suspicion of violating article 100 of the Civil Service Act (strict maintenance of secrecy). Then, on 23 November, the deputy chief of the political division of the Korean Commercial and Industrial Association in Japan, Yi Chae-won (37 years old), was also arrested. This was the so called "Foreign Ministry Spy Incident." Yi Chae-won's real identity was that of North Korean secret agent. He had obtained secret Foreign Ministry documents by bribing Yamamoto.

Yi had illegally come into the country before the war in 1939. At that time he was a youth of 9. In 1956 he graduated from Hosei University's sociology department. After graduating he served as an instructor at a Korean primary school in Gumma Prefecture until March 1963. After that he came to Tokyo and became deputy chief of the political division of the Korean Commercial and Industrial Association in Japan. Then he began intelligence activities.

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While he was studying at Hosei University, Yi had been involved in club activities of a society for study of the Korean question. He met Yamamoto at that time.

Later, knowing that Yamamoto's mother had become ill, Yi approached Yamamoto, ostensibly to ask about his mother's health. He led Yamamoto on with flattery. Then he had Yamamoto bring him secret Foreign Ministry documents. A Korean restaurant was used for contacts with Yamamoto. In return for the documents, Yi handed over several thousand yen at one of the contacts. From 1966 until the following year, the documents obtained in this were sent back to North Korea on scores of occasions by North Korean repatriation ships or other means.

There was much important information in the documents which Yamamoto passed to Yi such as copies of secret material concerning Japanese-Soviet summit talks. But this is not all that there was to the Yi incident, which was surprisingly more serious. There were actually a great many people implicated in the incident. According to the announcement by the Second External Affairs Division of the Metropolitan Police Department which handled the investigation they had about 146 persons appear for questioning about the circumstances. Most of these were employees of government agencies.

As a result of the investigation, an employee of the Cabinet Research Office (30 years old), a person from a certain research center of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (56 years old), an official of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (33 years old), an employee of a certain agency attached to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (61 years old), a female technical officer from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (36 years old), an employee of the Ministry of Transport (31 years old), and an employee of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (36 years old) all came to the surface as persons who had provided important information to Yi.

This intelligence net was actually the result of efforts put into maneuvers requiring a lot of leg work.

Generally, it is not easy for Koreans in Japan, particularly those that are pro-North Korea, to form close links with employees of government agencies who tend to be closed off from outsiders. For this reason, one can probably say that it would be very worthwhile for reference purposes to study the pretexts used by Yi.

Using a name card with a title such as "staff member of the Chosen Soren" or "reporter for the Korean Commercial and Industrial Association Newspaper in Japan," Yi would openly enter the various government agencies, select the target for his operation and decide on his approach. Therefore, he looked for pretexts to get close to his target. As a result, he chose the government employees listed above as targets for his operations.

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There were various pretexts for moves to approach a person. He approached an employee of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry by saying, "You have taken care of an exchange student from my mother country; I have come to..." He used the fact that an employee of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry had lent money to a Korean as an excuse for approaching the employee. In the case of the employee of the Transport Ministry, Yi took advantage of the fact that Yi's wife had previously taught the employee Korean. He approached the employee of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute on the grounds that he had earlier lived near the employee.

Using a pretext such as these, Yi would approach the target of his operation. First he would invite them to a meal. He would have several more meals with his targets. In the course of this he would indirectly ask about the content of their work. Later he would get them to bring him simple information by saying, "I would like to have such and such as reference material for my work." He would thank them appropriately for this. In this way he would build up personal relationships. Then gradually he would ask for high level information and have his target bring it to him.

This method is a very common process for creating agents. The problem is that Yi succeeded in his operations very easily.

Most of the government employees who Yi targeted were middle or lower level civil servants in their 30's who were called "non-career" people (persons without qualifications, those who did not pass the prewar high civil service examinations or the current high-level government service examinations. One can probably say that this fact was the key to the operation's success.

Since these people were non-career people in their 30's, they were veterans as far as their jobs were concerned and, consequently, they had to watch helplessly as younger people in the career group advanced easily upward. Their frustration and dissatisfaction were smoldering. Furthermore, having worked for a long time in the same work, they were conversant with the inside situation of the field to which they belonged and were very happy to have someone from the outside praise this.

Long-time assistant section chiefs who are old veterans nearing mandatory retirement in their jobs are frequently embroiled in corruption cases and, here too, it can be said that such people find a way to vent their dissatisfaction to the outside for the same reasons.

Furthermore, if money and goods are provided, these people become even weaker.

For middle-level civil servants and below, apart from what they might inherit from parents, life is never an easy thing and, unlike high ranking bureaucrats, employment after retirement is not assured.

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One can probably say that Yi succeeded in his operations by taking advantage of this weakness in the Japanese personnel management system for government employees.

It is also noteworthy that employees of the Cabinet Research Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, offices which handle classified information cooperated with Yi. This point is similar to the Rastoborov incident. (Note: refer to "SOVERSHITE SAMOUBIYSTVO (Commit Suicide)!" mentioned earlier in this book.)

The Cabinet Research Office is an investigative agency attached directly to the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet; allowing easy penetration of this organization by a foreign intelligence organization is a problem.

In general, the personal background investigation at the time of employment is incomparably more lax in government agencies, with the exception of security agencies such as the police of Public Security Investigation Agency, than in large private enterprises. Most of the ordinary government agencies have no security department or inspection system and, even when these do exist, they often exist in form only. Furthermore, the personnel people are so far lacking in specialized knowledge and know how in personnel management that they do not compare with personnel officers in large private enterprises. Of course, under the National Personnel Authority system, whether in the system for having qualified or in using demerits in grading, limits have been set in the minutest detail so that a first line personnel officer would have no room for imagination and skill and would probably become stultified.

Furthermore, the essential mistrust between the careerists and non-careerists gives rise to a gap between high and low which extends across both official and private matters. Communication between top and bottom does not work well and it is rare to find a case where a government agency executive knows the situation among the lower ranking employees and about their private lives.

For the most part, in most government agencies, excellent career people are installed as chief of the central personnel division; however, the work they actually do is to handle personnel shifts of careerists. It seems that gathering of "living personnel information" is hardly ever done.

From the standpoint of the side conducting the intelligence operation it is simply a matter of asking someone to do some spying.

The Yi incident involved a type of operation to develop collaborators on the inside from without but there are probably a fairly high number of infiltrators from the time they are employed.

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It is probably very easy for secret members of the Japan Communist Party to infiltrate government agencies. In general, we can probably say that the situation in Japan's government agencies shows a very fragile condition from the standpoint of protecting secrets and countering intelligence operations. Even though article 100 of the National Civil Service law (strict maintenance of secrets) is on the books, it is actually ineffective. Furthermore, the economic agencies have a fragile constitution not only as far as operations by foreign intelligence agencies are concerned. They are also very weak against approaches from domestic financial circles and private firms.

The Situation in Operations Against South Korea

Setting Up Koreans in Japan as Agents.

We have already examined "operations against South Korea", and Ko Yong-ho of the Hachioji incident had also received orders for such operations. The content was as follows: "In the South Korean Revolution use the form of a military coup d'etat and mobilize the air and ground forces. In the air forces form an underground organization equivalent to about one fighter wing. In the army form a provincial organization capable of mobilizing one division. Through control of the coastal defense forces and the air forces, proceed with underground operations so that there will be no problems. Concomitantly, establish contact bases in Japan. At the same time put liaison people in place."

Establishment of a revolutionary capability of this size is itself the objective of the operations against South Korea. Kim Il-song has said that the time for North Korean liberation of South Korea will be when construction of the three great revolutionary forces is finished.

The three great revolutionary forces are:

- (1) The force for world revolution:
- (2) The force for North Korean liberation of South Korea;
- (3) The force for revolution among the South Korean people. Japan is a very desirable base particularly for carrying out operations to establish (3) the force for revolution among the South Korean people. In any case, there are Koreans living in Japan who seem to total 600,000. Thus, it is comparatively easy to go from Japan to South Korea. Thus, it is relatively easy to make agents of Koreans living in Japan, send them to South Korea and carry on activities there. Furthermore, about 300,000 of the total number of 600,000 Koreans in Japan are gathered together in the pro-North Korean Chosen Soren and this powerful organization can be used advantageously for various activities.

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It is particularly useful for collecting information which is both directly and indirectly useful. For example, it is useful for collecting information in connection with the selection and training of agents to be sent to North Korea for training and in connection with the "root man operations." In the case of Ko Yong-ho who was involved in the Hachioji Incident, Yi Tong-Chun, the chief of the organization division of the Chosen Soren, mounted a direct acquisition operation. Mun Sekwang, the assailant in the recent Mun Se-Kwang incident, who shot at President Pak, on the Korean Independence Day, missed and shot and killed Pak's wife who was a Korean living in Japan. Mun Se-Kwang associated frequently on very good terms with Mikiko Yoshii. From her he obtained a copy of the family register of her husband who was about the same age as Mun and in this way received a passport issued by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Together with Mikiko Yoshii he traveled to Hong Kong. Hong Kong is also a place which is much used as a base for North Korean agents infiltrating Japan. Colloquially, it is even called the "Hong Kong Route." Mun Se-kwang, too, may have unexpectedly made contact with the North Korean side in Hong Kong.

Mun and Mikiko Yoshii also boarded the ship Mangyongbong-ho which put into Niigata. It can probably be said that the Chosen Soren was connected with this too. If there is a report from the Chosen Soren that a person is dangerous, he cannot go on board the Mangyongbong-ho.

Furthermore, the pistol which was used in the crime was stolen from a police box of 1 the Osaka Metropolitan Police. The person who stole it was at least probably a member of the anti-Pak faction. If not, it would probably have been difficult for it to have been passed smoothly into Mun's hands and used in the shooting attack on President Pak.

Nevertheless, it is probably more correct to say that the organization called the Chosen Soren is a branch of the North Korean workers Party in Japan than that it is a pro-North Korean group. That is, while Chosen Soren chairman Kang Tok-Su and other cadres are Koreans who live in Japan, they are selected for the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers Party and often look to North Korea for direction. Currently, if some one wishes to be repatriated to North Korea this can be realized; the repatriation vessel Mangyongbong-ho calls frequently at Niigata. Nevertheless, Chosen Soren cadres do not try to return. Han Tok-su who is a member of the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers Party seems to have no intention of returning to North Korea even though he is appointed to the Central Committee.

Although recently it has become somewhat less so, it is a fact that, in Japan, in employment and other areas there is some disadvantage in being Korean. North Korea, according to its own propaganda, is "a country of the Challima." It is supposed to be a nation of the people where development is flourishing under the guidance of "our great leader Kim Il-song." Furthermore, the population density is low and there is a labor shortage. In these terms North Korea calls for repatriation.

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Nevertheless, there are too few people in the Chosen Soren who want to return to "the developing motherland, the Democratic Peoples Republic of North Korea." Consequently, the ships leaving Niigata for North Korea are in reality nearly totally empty. Because of this situation, the people in the [Pro-South Korean] Mindan say that the people in the Chosen Soren are in fact well aware of the poverty and strictly disciplined life in North Korea and because life in Japan is better than life in North Korea, the people of the Chosen Soren, whatever they might say, will not go back to North Korea, but will cling to Japan.

The only way for the Chosen Soren to rebut this is to increase the number of persons being repatriated to North Korea; this is probably a point which causes a lot of headache.

Conversely, it seems that persons who cause trouble in the Chosen Soren are made to return to North Korea immediately. Several years ago, (then) First Vice Chairman Kim Pyong-sik who had lost a leadership struggle in the Chosen Soren leadership ranks was driven out by Han Tok-su and sent to North Korea on the ship Hyoksin-ho in what looked like a case of compulsory repatriation. However, the large Chosen Soren organization which is composed of nearly 300,000 people practices admirable secrecy. Personnel affairs involving its officers are not made public even at the level of bureau directors in its central headquarters. It is said that its organ CHOSUN SINBO is not easily allowed to be sold to Japanese. In brief, the organization at the central headquarters includes the general meeting, the Central Committee, the Central Standing Committee, the inspection committee, 15 bureaus for such purposes as general affairs, industry, plans, publication, organization, propaganda, political affairs, social affairs, economics, education, international affairs, culture and fiscal affairs and an office of assistants to the chairman. The regional organization has 49 regional headquarters in the Prefectures and Metropolitan Administrative Districts of Japan; 419 branch offices and 2700 subgroups and teams have been established under the regional headquarters.

Furthermore, the organization has established schools to provide nationalistic education. University (located in Kodaira, in the Tokyo area under the name of the Korean University). Approval for the various kinds of schools has come from the capital and has caused problems.

High schools 12

Middle schools 56

Primary schools 92

In addition, the following schools have been established for training of cadre.

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Central (Political) Academy (Tokyo)
Kanto Regional (Political) Academy (Omiya)
Kinki Regional (Political) Academy (Osaka)
Kyushu Regional (Political) Academy (Fukuoka)
Kanto Academy of Economics (Hakone)
Kansai Academy of Economics (Kobe)
Korean Credit Union Academy (Tokyo)

Financially, the schools seem to be fairly prosperous from money sent from North Korea educational funds, money contributed by Koreans who operate businesses and interest from Korean banks and credit unions.

Program for Visiting Ancestral Graves Dealt a Blow to the Chosen Soren

Not all of the people gathered into the Chosen Soren come from north of the 38th parallel. A rather large number of them come from south of the 38th parallel.

By comparison with other peoples, the Koreans have very strong feelings of nostalgia for home. Furthermore, they have a particularly strong feeling of wanting to meet their blood relatives. A longing for home and a love of family are the primary characteristics of the Korean people. The tactic which has taken advantage of these national traits has been the "root man operations" which were mentioned earlier. The "root man operations" would probably not have met with such success against other races.

Several years ago, the people at the South Korean Embassy in Japan decided to grant permission for persons having ancestral graves in South Korea to visit those graves if they wished even if they were persons from the Chosen Soren. This idea was promoted mainly by Cho Il-che who was then Consulate General for South Korea in Osaka (he is currently Minister at the embassy in Tokyo). When the plan was implemented the Chosen Soren put every effort into tactics to block it. In other words, this "program for visiting ancestral graves" was a serious threat to the Chosen Soren.

In spite of the efforts to block it, the program for visiting ancestral graves was put into operation and produced a number of people who had returned to Korea and actually seen with their own eyes the development of South Korea which was called the "Miracle of the Han River." Many of these people were able to travel freely to various places and it is said that they were surprised at the actual situation in South Korea where material goods had become plentiful.

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- On the other hand, life is not bountiful for the people of North Korea.
- To such an extent is this so that even visiting executives of the Chosen Soren are not able to travel as they will. In any case, conditions are such that the cadres of the Chosen Soren who can be expected to be praising North Korea's great leader Kim Il-song do not want to return to North Korea.

It is clear at a glance which is more affluent, South Korea which is open even to hostile elements, or North Korea which is closed even to its allies. At any rate, it is said that the Chosen Soren does not seem to be what it used to be once.

Procurement in Japan of Materiel for Guerrilla Units

Carried on North Korean Trading Ships

On 28 August 1967 armed North Korean special agents wearing South Korean military uniforms and impersonating South Korean soldiers infiltrated from the mouth of the Han River. They engaged South Korean Marines in a skirmish. Two of the agents were killed in the fight and one was arrested. On the same day the bodies of two armed special agents were discovered in the Hant'an'-gang river area of the central ceasefire line. One of them was wearing the uniform of a lieutenant in the South Korean Army and the other had one South Korean Army non-commissioned officer's uniform. Compasses, random number charts and maps were found in their pockets. On 22 January of the following year, 1968, 31 crack troops of the 124th special armed guerrilla unit subordinate to the Reconnaissance Bureau of the North Korean National Defense Ministry, using mountain trails and totally avoiding public roads, penetrated the Military Demarcation Line and infiltrated the capital, Seoul. They were on a secret mission to attack the "Blue House" which is the presidential residence, and assassinate President Park. When they approached the "Blue House", however, they ran into a patrol unit led by Chief Ch'oe of the Chongno Police Department and a fight took place. Police chief Choe was killed but 25 members of the North Korean guerrilla unit were shot and killed and two apprehended one of whom committing suicide after arrest, by South Korean Police and U.S. troops and President Park narrowly escaped unharmed.

The existence of the Secret Unit, 124th army, was learned of through the confession of the man who was seized. Their training was so severe that the soles of their feet were completely covered with cuts from running day and night through the mountains. However, their treatment in terms of rations and so forth was very good. Rations are ranked in classes ranging from first to ninth class rations but the soldiers of the 124th army were allotted giant sized first class rations.

Reportedly, the 124th army has recently been expanded and built up and has become the Special Eighth Group, an independent guerrilla specialist group; according to one story it numbers 50,000 men. Of all the countries in the world, no country has a specialized guerrilla unit on the army corps level.

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Nevertheless, various materiel, such as South Korean uniforms and travel papers are needed for this type of armed guerrillas to invade South Korea. There was a group carrying out operations to procure this materiel in Japan.

At the end of 1967, the police in Hyogo Prefecture arrested a large North Korean spy group composed of the following members:

Kim Tu-paek: Representative and Director of Myonghwa Trading Company; younger of two brothers

Kim Tu-wan: Director of Samyong Travel Company; elder of two brothers

Ch'oe Tan-chom: wife of Kim Tu-paek

Kim Ki-ho: Trade borker

Chong Un-cho: Living in South Korea (Brother of Sang-cho)

Yukio Hashimoto: Trader

Yukio Inamoto: Trader

Kim Sung-yol: In the business of manufacturing and marketing shoes

Chong Sang-cho: President of Samhwa Trading Company

These people had been smuggling materiel collected for North Korea on the "Nr. 10 Ryokichi Maru." They became known to the authorities by buying South Korean currency in large amounts. Having caught rumors of the currency buying the authorities proceeded with a quiet investigation. Kim Tu-paek and Kim Tu-wan surfaced in the course of the investigation. Then it was learned that they were using the Nr. 10 Ryokichi Maru to trade with North Korea.

The questions was, "Why did they need large amounts of South Korean currency to trade with North Korea?"

As the investigation continued, it was learned that they were purposely procuring men's and women's clothing from South Korea. Suspicious deepened.

In November 1967 the Hyogo Prefectural Police caught the news that the Nr. 10 Ryokichi Maru was leaving port for North Korea. In collaboration with the Maritime Safety Agency, they searched the Nr. 10 Ryokichi Maru. Aboard the ship there were about 4 million won in South Korean currency and 3.5 million yen in Japanese currency. Therefore, investigation of the Kim brothers on suspicion of violation of the foreign exchange laws and customs laws was begun. Results showed that the Kim group's objective was to smuggle South Korean and Japanese currency to North Korea. They also procured various items to be used by spies. The group was broken down into liason, collection and transport elements; only Kim Tu-paek made contact with the North

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Korean intelligence agency. The mission of collecting equipment belonged to Chong Sang-cho. He relied on a South Korean seaman who was an acquaintance of his brother who lived in South Korea to bring him items which were difficult to collect in Japan. Items which they collected included South Korean currency, Japanese currency, South Korean identification papers, South Korean military uniforms, rank insignia, special unit identification papers, railway employee uniforms, police uniforms and police notebooks.

It is said that beginning around the spring of 1967, the North Koreans were pushing Kim Tu-paek especially hard regarding military uniforms. As stated at the beginning of this section, several incidents occurred in August of that year in which North Koreans guerrillas wearing South Korean military uniforms tried to infiltrate South Korea.

From this it would seem that North Korean proceeded with infiltration of South Korea by armed guerrillas in 1967 and 1968 according to plan.

Furthermore, it is said that the Kim group was collecting women's South Korean uniforms for all seasons of the year. Therefore, there was probably a special women's unit in North Korea preparing to infiltrate South Korea.

According to Kim Tu-paek's confession, there was always someone observing him closely. Probably a separate group from the North Korean intelligence agency was observing the Kim group. It can probably be said that the operations of the Kim group were this important to the North Koreans.

Earlier brief mention was made of the Special Eighth Army Group. According to testimony given by a soldier who surrendered, there is an airborne brigade at Wonson. The gliders in particular are suitable for attack because they cannot be spotted by radar (being made of wood and so forth, the body of the craft does not reflect radio waves and does not appear on radar). The moves of these brigades are matters of concern to both U.S. and South Korean authorities.

There is a story circulating in some quarters that the material for the gliders was procured in Japan. There is also talk about large amounts of equipment for submarines flowing toward North Korea. Whether these stories are true or not the Kim group earlier collected material for disguising guerrillas and it is highly possible that North Korea would arrange to procure this type of materiel in Japan. In this area, the South Korean authorities are attentive to North Korean "operations against South Korea" in Japan.

Reference Material: Chart of North Korean Spy Incidents

Incident	Date	Ringleader
First North Korean Spy Incident	9 Sep 1950	Ho Kil-song

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Second North Korean Spy Incident	20 Sep 1953	Kim Il-kok
Third North Korean Spy Incident	26 Jun 1955	Han Chae-tok
Kosho Maru Incident 25 Jun 1957	25 Jun 1957	Ch'oe Yong-un
Shinko Maru Incident	28 Dec 1957	Kim Ki-yong
Forth North Korean Spy Incident	30 Oct 1958	Kan Nae-Kon
Taki Incident	31 Jul 1959	Cho Ch'ang-Kuk
Hamazaka Incident	29 Sep 1960	Kim Chun-Yong
Daiju Maru Incident	24 Jul 1962	Ch'oe Ch'an-sik
Haebang-ho Incident	24 Sep 1962	Yi Sung-Ki
Ajigasawa Incident	10 Nov 1962	O Chae-sun
First Noshiro Incident	1 Apr 1963	Two Drifting Corpses
Second Noshiro Incident	10 May 1963	One Drifting Corpse
Sakata Incident	21 May 1963	Kim Yong-sok
Tong Group Incident	14 May 1964	Tong Kil-mo
Samhwa Incident	16 Jul 1964	Yi Kim-pang
Honjohama Incident	24 Jul 1964	Song Hyon-kil
Ichinomiya Incident	29 Jul 1964	Pak Su-sok
Nemurogawa Incident	31 Oct 1964	Pak Ki-chun
Kamata Incident	15 Dec 1964	Kim Tong-am
Kanda Incident	15 Mar 1965	Yi Yong-ch'ol
Edogawa Incident	2 Aug 1965	Song Hui-ton
Nagata Incident	30 Aug 1965	Ch'oe Chun-hup
Foreign Ministry Spy Incident	23 Nov 1967	Yi Chae-won

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Kim Group	15 Dec 1967	Kim Tu-paik
Higashi Osaka Incident	18 Nov 1968	Han Ch'an-Kum
Mayakojima Incident	26 Nov 1968	Chong Ki-yong
Iwasaki-Noshiro Incident	13 Nov 1969	Kim Pang-chin
Hachioji Incident	16 Nov 1970	Ko Yong-ho
Ishihara Incident	21 Sep 1971	O Sun-pae
Adachi Incident	25 Sep 1971	Pak Kyong-hwa
Onkai Incident	5 Aug 1973	Ch'oe Kwang-song
Mazuyama Incident	12 Dec 1973	Kim Il-tong
Nagoya Incident	20 May 1974	Yi Il-yong
Mimura Incident	26 Jun 1974	Kong Yong-sun
Shirozaki Incident	19 Sep 1974	Ham Kuk-sang
Yi Incident	20 Sep 1974	Yi Yong-hwan
Ajigasawa Incident	20 Aug 1975	Yi Min-ch'ol
Cho Incident	29 Jun 1976	Cho Ch'ang-cho
Han Incident	21 Nov 1976	Han T'ae-pin

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N. KOREA/FOREIGN TRADE

NORTH KOREA OFFERS TO SELL MIDEAST OIL TO JAPAN

Tokyo JIJI PRESS in English no time given 19 Jan 80 OW

[Text] Tokyo, Jan 19 (JIJI PRESS)--North Korea has offered to sell Japanese trading houses crude oil it obtains from such Middle East countries as Kuwait and Iraq in return for exports of cement, steel and other industrial products, according to sources here.

The proposed deal, if successful, would open a new oil supply channel for this country--import of Middle East oil via a communist nation.

But the Japanese are in doubt about what to do, since the North Korean's intentions are not necessarily clear and the proposed deal might end up as a "one-time" affair.

Moreover, they fear that such oil deal might develop into a political issue with Middle East oil-producing countries involved.

The offer was made informally by North Korean authorities when about 20 Japanese trading firms dispatched a mission to Pyongyang under the auspices of the Japan-(North) Korea Trade Association from November to December last year, the sources said.

North Korea depends on China and the Soviet Union for almost all its oil needs, although it is now out to develop offshore oil reserves near the mouth of the Taedong River on the Western Coast and elsewhere.

It has reportedly no oil refining facilities except one near the Soviet border for refining crude oil supplied by the Soviet Union.

There are no oil unloading facilities, either, at its external trade ports on the western coast.

In addition, if Middle East countries would furnish heavy crude oil, North Korea is supposed to have neither facilities nor techniques for cracking it into light-quality oil, such as gasoline.

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It is probably for these reasons that the trade authorities in Pyongyang are considering passing Middle East oil direct to Japan as a means of rectifying North Korea's heavy trade deficit with this country, the sources said.

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